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ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS Appellate Court People v. Deng, 2013 IL App (2d) 111089 Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARENG DENG, Defendant-Appellant. District & No. Second District Docket No. 2-11-1089 Filed June 14, 2013 Held (Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.) Defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to first-degreemurder in exchange for a sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment for shooting the victim of a residential burglary was void, since he was not admonished about the mandatory sentencing enhancement of 25 years to life that applied to his offense; therefore, the judgment was vacated and the cause was remanded to allow defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 07-CF-2958; the Hon. Allen M. Anderson, Judge, presiding. Judgment Vacated and remanded. Counsel on Appeal Thomas A. Lilien and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant. Joseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M. Bauer and Aline Dias, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People. Panel JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hutchinson and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶ 1 Defendant, Gareng Deng, appeals his sentence of 35 years’ incarceration for first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2004)). He contends that his sentence and plea agreement are void because he did not receive, and was not admonished about, a mandatory sentencing enhancement. We agree. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand to allow defendant to withdraw his plea. ¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND ¶ 3 In November 2007, defendant was charged with multiple counts in connection with events that occurred in October 2005. He later pleaded guilty to count III, which charged that defendant, without lawful justification, while committing the forcible felony of residential burglary, shot Marilyn Bethell with a firearm, causing her death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2004). Other counts also involved the use of a firearm. In particular, count I alleged that defendant, without lawful justification and with the intent to kill, shot Bethell with a firearm, causing her death when he personally discharged the firearm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2004). Count II alleged that defendant, without lawful justification, shot Bethell, knowing that the act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm when he personally discharged the firearm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004). ¶ 4 At the preliminary hearing, the State told the court that counts I and II alleged that defendant personally discharged a firearm, such that a mandatory enhancement of 25 years to life applied to those counts. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004). The court asked for clarification, inquiring if an enhancement was alleged only in counts I and II, and the State affirmed this. The court then admonished defendant that counts I and IIsubjected him to 20 to 60 years’ incarceration, 3 years of mandatory supervised release, fines of up to $25,000, and a 25-year-to-life enhancement. Defendant was admonished that count III subjected him to 20 to 60 years’ incarceration, 3 years of mandatory supervised release, and fines of up to $25,000. Defendant stated that he understood. -2- ¶ 5 On May 9, 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to count III under a negotiated plea agreement. Defendant stipulated to a factual basis that restated the charge, including that he shot Bethell during a residential burglary. The factual basis also included that Bethell was found dead along a path, with a gunshot wound to the head, and that she was shot at the location where her body was found. Defendant was seen exiting Bethell’s vehicle after an accident and then entering another vehicle. His DNA was recovered from Bethell’s home and from a bicycle found near her home. A “CZ caliber” Torkerev weapon was recovered and compared to bullets recovered from Bethell’s body, but no match could be made. However, a bullet showed the class characteristics of a Torkerev. ¶ 6 The State informed the court that, in exchange for the plea, defendant would be sentenced to 35 years’ incarceration to be served at 100% and the other counts would be dismissed. The court admonished defendant that the offense carried a penaltyof 20 to 60 years’ incarceration and it accepted the plea. ¶ 7 Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and alleging that a person named Robert actually committed the crime. The motion was denied. Defendant appeals. ¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 9 Defendant contends that, under People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, his sentence is void because it was subject to a mandatory enhancement of 25 years to life and the failure to properly admonish him of the enhancement made the plea agreement void. ¶ 10 Undersection 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2004)), the sentencing range for first-degree murder is 20 to 60 years’ incarceration (730 ILCS 5/5-8- 1(a)(1)(a) (West 2004)). However, section 5-8-1 requires the imposition of an enhanced sentence where a firearm is used in the offense, providing that “if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused *** death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004). ¶ 11 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (eff. July 1, 1997) provides that a trial court cannot enter a final judgment on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 17. “The factual basis for a guilty plea generally will consist of an express admission by the defendant that he committed the acts alleged in the indictment or a recital to the court of the evidence that supports the allegations in the indictment.” Id. “[T]he factual basis will be established as long as there is a basis anywhere in the record up to the final judgment from which the judge could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant actually committed the acts with the intent, if any, required to constitute the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” People v. Brazee, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1230, 1236 (2000). ¶ 12 “Once a trial court accepts a plea of guilty, it is the duty of the court to fix punishment.” White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 20. The supreme court has “ ‘repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences -3- restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing sentences.’ ” Id.(quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 129 (2004)). A court does not have authority to impose a sentence that does not conform with statutory guidelines and it exceeds its authority when it orders a lesser or greater sentence than mandated by statute. Id. “In such a case, the defendant’s sentence is illegal and void.” Id. “Whether a sentence is void is a question of law subject to de novo review.” People v. Cortez, 2012 IL App (1st) 102184, ¶ 9. ¶ 13 In White, the defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and possession of contraband in a penal institution, in exchange for consecutive prison sentences of 28 and 4 years. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 4. The factual basis for the plea established that, if the case proceeded to trial, the evidence would show that the defendant and a codefendant planned to rob a taxi driver and were both inside the taxi when the driver was shot in the temple with a handgun. It was further stipulated that, after the driver was shot, the defendant took the handgun from the codefendant and put it in his back pocket. Id. ¶ 6. The defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing in part that he was not properly admonished about the sentencing range because he was subject to a 15-year mandatory enhancement for being armed with a firearm while committing the offense. Id. ¶ 9; see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (West 2004). As a result, the defendant argued, his sentence was void because it was below the mandatory minimum. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 9. The trial court denied the motion. ¶ 14 Our supreme court held that the defendant’s sentence was void. Id. ¶ 21. The court noted that a trial court may not impose a sentence inconsistent with the governing statutes even where the parties and the trial court agree to the sentence. Id. ¶ 23. The court then specifically rejected an argument that the intent of the parties to agree to a murder conviction without the sentencing enhancement was controlling, noting that, in enacting section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i), the legislature took away any discretion the State and the trial court had to fashion a sentence that did not include the enhancement. Id. ¶ 26. The court concluded that, since the factual basis for the defendant’s plea established that the victim died of a gunshot wound, the sentencing enhancement was mandatoryand the defendant’s sentence, which did not contain the enhancement, was void. Id. ¶ 21. Further, because the defendant was not admonished of the enhancement, the plea agreement was void as well. Id. The court remanded the case to the trial court with directions to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶ 31. In a special concurrence, Justice Theis observed that, had the State wished to negotiate around the enhancement, it should have presented a factual basis that referred to a dangerous weapon instead of a firearm. Id. ¶ 41 (Theis, J., specially concurring). ¶ 15 Here, the State presented a factual basis that included the fact that defendant “shot” Bethell with a firearm, causing her death. Thus, defendant argues, he was subject to the mandatory enhancement. The State attempts to distinguish White, arguing that the factual basis did not include the words “personally discharged” or otherwise show that defendant “personally discharged” a firearm. Instead, the State suggests, the record shows an intent to plead guilty to an offense based on an accountability theory. In doing so, the State relies on a case holding that the term “personally discharged” in section 5-8-1 distinguishes cases in which the defendant actually fired the shot from cases in which the defendant could be held accountable for a shooting done by another. People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill. 2d 285, 294-95 (2008). The State then relies on a case in which multiple people fired shots, the defendant -4- and another were charged with shooting the victim, and the court held that it was not necessary to prove that the defendant fired the shot that wounded the victim. People v. Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 540 (1974). But those cases are not applicable here, because an accountability theory was not presented by the factual basis. ¶ 16 The State asserts that the factual basis, by referring to defendant’s entering another vehicle, could have implied the involvement of another person. But that reference was not sufficient to show that defendant was guilty only under an accountability theory. There was no allegation that any other person shot Bethell or was even present when the shooting occurred. To the contrary, the charge, which was specifically included in the factual basis, stated that defendant “shot” Bethell, causing her death, and the additional facts provided served to place defendant at Bethell’s home. The brief mention of another vehicle does not transform the matter into one involving accountability. ¶ 17 While it is possible that the State intended to remove the enhancement when it was negotiating the plea, as evinced by the State’s telling the court at the preliminary hearing that only counts I and II involved the enhancement, it did nothing to remove the enhancement from the factual basis for the plea. Had the State wished to negotiate a plea based on an accountability theory, it could have amended the factual basis to support such a theory. In the alternative, it could have amended the factual basis to allege that defendant caused the death with a dangerous weapon, as suggested by Justice Theis specially concurring in White. But it did not do so. Accordingly, the trial court was left with no sufficient basis to find that anyone other than defendant personally discharged the firearm that caused Bethell’s death. It was thus required to sentence defendant with the 25-year-to-life enhancement, making 45 years the minimum possible sentence. Because defendant was sentenced to less than that amount, and was not admonished of the enhancement, his sentence and the plea agreement that led to it are void. ¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 19 Defendant’s sentence and plea agreement are void. Accordingly, under White, the judgment of the circuit court of KaneCounty is vacated and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial if he chooses to do so. ¶ 20 Vacated and remanded. -5-
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## I L L I N O I S ## O F F I C I A L ## RE P O R T S Appellate Court People v . Deng, 2013 IL App (2d) 111089 Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. GARENG DENG, De fenda nt-Appellant. District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-11-1089 Filed J une 14, 2013 Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f o r t h e c o n v e n i e n c e o f t h e rea der . ) Def endant’ s agree ment to plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchang e for a sentenc e of 35 y ear s’ imprisonment for shootin g th e victim of a residential burg lary was void, since he wa s not admonished about the mandatory sentenc ing enhanc ement of 25 year s to life that applied to his offe nse; there fore , the judgme nt was vacated and the cause was rema nded to allow defe ndant to withdraw his plea and proc eed to tria l. Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit C o u rt of Kane County , No. 07-CF- 2958; the Hon. Allen M. Ande rson, J udg e, pre siding. J udg ment Vac ated a nd rema nded.Counsel on Appea l T h o m as A. L ilien and Steven E. Wil tge n, both of State Appellate Def ender ’s Off ice, of Elg in, for appe llant. J oseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney , of St. C h ar les (L awr ence M. Ba uer a nd Aline Dias, both of State’ s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’s Offic e, of c ounsel), for the People. Panel J USTI CE Z ENOF F de livered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion. J ustices Hutchinson and J org ensen concur red i n t he judgme nt and opinion. OP INION ¶ 1 Def endant, Gar eng Deng , appea ls his sentenc e of 35 y ear s’ incar cer ation for first-degree m urd er (720 I L CS 5/9-1(a) (3) (West 2004)). He contends that his sentenc e and pl ea agree ment are void beca use he did not rec eive, and was not admonished about, a mandatory sentenc ing enhanc ement. We agree . Acc ording ly , we vacate th e s en tence and rema nd to allow def endant to withdra w his plea. ¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 In November 2007, defe ndant was charg ed wi t h m u l t i p l e co u n t s in connec tion with events that occur red in October 2005. He later pleade d guilty to count I I I , which charg ed that defe ndant, without lawful justification, while committing the f orcible f elony of residential burg lary , shot Marily n Be thell with a firea rm, causing her death. 720 I L CS 5/9-1(a) (3) (West 2004). Other counts also involved the use of a firea rm. In particula r, count I alleg ed that defe ndant, without lawful justification and with the intent to kill, shot Be thell with a firea rm, causing her death when he personally discharg ed the firea rm. 720 I L CS 5/9-1(a)(1 ) (W est 2004). C ount I I alleg ed that defe ndant, wit hout lawful justification, shot Be thell, knowing that the act cre ated a strong probability of death or g reat bodily harm when he persona lly discharg ed the f irea rm. 720 I L CS 5/ 9-1(a )(2) (West 2004). ¶ 4 At the preli m i n ar y h ea ri n g, t h e S tate told the court that counts I and I I alleg ed that defe ndant persona lly discharg ed a firea rm, such that a mandatory enhanc ement of 25 y ear s to life applied to those counts. 730 I L CS 5/5-8-1(a )(1) (d)( iii) (West 2004). The court asked for clar ification, inquiring if an enhanc ement was all ege d o n l y in counts I and I I , and the State aff irmed this. The court then admonished defe ndant that counts I and I I subjected him to 20 to 60 y ear s’ incar cer ation, 3 y ear s of mandatory supervised release, fines of up to $25,000, and a 25-year -t o -l ife enhanc ement. Def endant was admonished that count I I I subjected him to 20 to 60 year s’ incar cer ation, 3 y ear s of mandatory supervised rele ase, and fines of up to $25,000. De fenda nt stated that he unde rstood. -2-¶ 5 On May 9, 2009, defe ndant pleade d guilty to count I I I under a neg otiated plea a g ree ment. Def endant stipulated to a fac tual basis that restate d the charg e, including that he shot Be thell during a residential burg lary . T h e fa ct u al basis also included that Be thell was found dead along a path, with a gunshot wound to the head, and that she was shot at the location wher e her body was found. Def endant was seen exit ing Be thell’s vehicle afte r an acc ident and then enter ing another vehicle. His DNA was rec overe d from Be thell’s home and f rom a bicycle found near her home. A “CZ caliber ” T o rk er ev wea pon was rec overe d and compar ed to bullets rec overe d from Be thell’s body , but no match could be made. How ev er , a bullet showed the c lass char acte ristics of a Tor kere v. ¶ 6 The State informed the court that, in exchang e for the plea, defe ndant would be sentenc ed to 35 y ear s’ incar cer ation to be serve d at 100% and the other counts would be dismiss ed. The court admonished defe ndant that the offe nse car ried a penalty of 20 to 60 y ear s’ incar cer ation and it acc epted the ple a. ¶ 7 Def endant moved to wi t h d ra w h i s p lea, arguing ineffe ctive assistance of counsel a nd alleg ing that a person named Robert actua lly committed the crime. The motion was denied. Def endant a ppeals. ¶ 8 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 9 Def endant contends that, under People v. W hite , 20 1 1 I L 109616, his sentenc e is void beca use it was subject to a mandatory enhanc ement of 25 y ear s to life and the failu re to proper ly admonish him of the enhanc ement made the plea a g ree ment void. ¶ 10 Under section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Correc tions (730 I L CS 5/5-8-1 (West 2004)), the sentenc ing rang e for first-degree murder is 20 to 60 y ear s’ incar cer ation (730 I L CS 5/5-8- 1(a) (1)( a) (West 2004)). Howeve r, section 5-8-1 require s the imp o s i t i o n of an enhanc ed sentenc e wher e a firea rm is used in the offe nse, providing that “if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharg ed a firea rm th at p ro x i m ately cause d *** death t o an o t h er person, 25 y ear s or up to a term of natura l life shall be added to the term o f imprisonment impos ed by the cour t.” 730 I L CS 5/ 5-8-1( a)( 1)(d) (iii) (West 2004). ¶ 11 I llinois Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (ef f. J uly 1, 1997) provides that a trial court c annot enter a final judgme nt on a plea of guilty without first deter mining that there is a fac tual basis for the plea. W hite , 2011 I L 109616, ¶ 17. “The fac tual basis for a guilty plea g ener ally will consist of an exp ress admissi on by the defendant that he commit ted t he acts alleg ed in the indictment or a re ci tal to the court of the evidenc e that supports the alleg ations in the indictment.” Id. “[T] he fac tual basis will be established as long as there is a basis any wher e in the rec o rd up to the final judgme nt from which the judge could rea sonably rea ch the conclusion that the defe ndant actua lly committed the acts with the intent, if any , require d to constitute the offe nse to which he is pleading guilty .” People v. B r a z ee , 3 1 6 I l l. App. 3d 1230, 1236 (2000). ¶ 12 “Onc e a trial court acc epts a plea of guilty , it is the duty of the court to fix punishment.” W h i t e , 2 0 1 1 I L 109616, ¶ 20. The supreme court has “ ‘re peate dly rec og nized that the leg islature has the power to presc ribe penal t i es for define d offe nses, and that power nece ssarily includes the authority to pr escr ibe mandatory sentenc es, even if such sentenc es -3-restric t the judiciary ’s discretion in imposing sentenc es.’ ” I d . ( q u o ting People v. Huddleston , 212 I ll. 2d 107, 129 (2004)) . A court does not have authority to impose a sentenc e that does not confor m with statutory guidelines and it e x cee ds its a uthority when it or ders a lesser or g reater sentenc e than mandated by statu t e. Id . “In such a case , the defe ndant’s sentenc e is i l l ega l an d void.” Id. “Whether a sentenc e is void is a question of law subject to de n o vo revie w.” People v . Cortez , 2012 I LApp (1st) 102184, ¶ 9. ¶ 13 In W hite , the defe ndant p l ea d ed gu i l t y t o fi rs t -d egr ee m u rder and possession of contra band in a penal institution, in exchang e for consec utive prison sentenc es of 28 and 4 y ear s. W hite , 2011 I L 109616, ¶ 4. The fac tual basis for the plea established that, if the case proce eded to trial, the evidence would show that the defendant and a code fenda nt planned to rob a taxi driver and wer e both inside the taxi when the driver was shot in the temple with a handg un. It was further stipulated that, afte r the driver was shot, the defe ndant took the handgun from the codef endant and put it in h is back pocket. Id. ¶ 6. The defe ndant later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing in part that he was not proper ly admonished about the sentenc ing rang e beca use he was subject to a 15-year mandatory enhanc ement for being arme d with a firea rm while committing the offe nse. Id. ¶ 9; see 730 I L CS 5/5-8-1(a )(1) (d)( i) (West 2004). As a result, the defe ndant argued, his sentenc e was void beca use it was below the mandator y minimum . W hite , 2011 I L109616, ¶ 9. The tr ial court de nied the motion. ¶ 14 Our supreme court held that the defe ndant’s sentenc e was void. Id. ¶ 21. The court noted that a trial co u rt may not impose a sentenc e inconsistent with the g overning statutes even wher e the parties and the trial court agree to the sentenc e. Id. ¶ 23. The court then specific ally reje cted an argument that the intent of the parties to agree to a murder conviction without the sentenc ing e nhance ment was c ontrolling, notingthat, in enac ting se ction 5-8-1( a)( 1)(d) (i), the leg islature took awa y any discretion the State and the trial court had to fashion a sentenc e that did not in clude the enhanc ement. Id. ¶ 26. The court conclude d that, since the fac tual basis for the defe ndant’s plea established that the victim died of a gu n s h ot wound, the sentenc ing enhanc ement was mandatory and the defe ndant’s sentenc e, which did not contain the enhanc ement, was void. Id. ¶ 21. Fur ther, beca use the defe ndant was not admonished of the enha nceme nt, the plea a g ree ment was void as we ll. Id. The court rema nded the case to the t ri al co urt with direc tions to permit the defe ndant to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶ 31. In a specia l concur renc e, J ustice Theis observe d that, had the S tate wished to neg otiate around the enhanc ement, it should have prese nted a fac tual basis that ref err ed to a dang erous wea pon instead of a firea rm. Id. ¶ 41 (The is, J ., specia lly concur ring ). ¶ 15 Her e, the State prese nted a fac tual bas i s th at i n cl u d ed the fac t that defe ndant “shot” Be thell with a firea rm, causing her death. Thu s , defe ndant argues, he was subject to the mandatory enhanc ement. The State attempts to distinguish W hite , arguing that t he fac tual basis did not incl u de the words “per sonally discharg ed” or otherwise show that defe ndant “per sonally discharg ed” a firea rm. Instead, the State sug g ests, the rec ord shows an intent to plead guilty to an offe nse based on an acc ountability theory . In doing so, the State relies on a case holding that the term “per sonally discharg ed” in se ction 5-8-1 distinguishes case s in which the defe ndant actua lly fired the shot from case s in which the defe ndant could be held ac countable for a shooting done by another . People v. Rodriguez , 229 I ll. 2d 28 5 , 2 9 4 -9 5 (2008). The State then relies on a case in which mul tiple people fired s h ots, the defendant -4-and another wer e charg ed with shooting the victim, and the court h el d th at it was not nece ssary to prove that the defe ndant fired the shot that wounded the victim. People v. Allen , 56 I ll. 2d 536, 540 (1974). But those case s are not applicable here , beca use an acc ountability theory was not pre sented by the fa ctual basis. ¶ 16 The State asser ts that the fac tual basis, by ref er ri n g t o d ef en d ant’s enter ing a nother vehicle, could have implied the involvement of another person. B ut that ref ere nce was not sufficie nt to show that defe ndant was guilty only under an acc ountability theory . There was no alleg ation that any other person s h o t Be thell or was even prese nt when the shooting occur red. To the contrary , the charg e, which was specifica lly included in the fa ctual basis, stated that defe ndant “shot” Be thell, causing her death, and the addit i o nal fac ts provided serve d to place defe ndant at Be thell’s home. The brief mention of another vehicle does not transfor m the matter into one involvingacc ountability . ¶ 17 Whil e it is possib l e t h at t h e S t at e intended to remove the enhanc ement when it was neg otiating the plea, as evince d by the State’s telling the court at the preliminary hearing that only counts I and I I involved the enhanc ement, it did nothing to remove the en h an ce m en t from the fac tual basis for the p l ea . Ha d the State wished to neg otiate a plea based on an acc ountability theory , it could have amende d the fac tual basis to support such a theory . In the alternative, it could have amende d the fac tual basis to alleg e that defe ndant cause d the death with a dang erous wea pon, as sug g ested by J ustice Theis specia lly concur ring in W hite . But it did not do so. Acc ording ly , the trial court was left with no sufficie n t b asi s to find that anyone other than defe ndant persona lly discharg ed the firea rm that cause d Be thell’s death. It was thus require d to sentenc e defe ndant with the 25-year -to-life enhanc ement, making 45 y ear s the minimum possib l e sentenc e. Be cause defe ndant was sentenc ed to less than that amount, and was not admonished of the enhanc ement, his sentenc e and the plea agree ment that led to it are void. ¶ 18 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 19 Def endant’ s sentenc e and plea agree men t ar e v o i d . Ac co rd i n gl y , under W hite , the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Kane County is vacated and the cause is rema nded to the trial court with direc tions to allow defe ndant to withdraw his guilty plea and proce ed to trial if he chooses to do so. ¶ 20 Vac ated a nd rema nded. -5-