SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 6D23-1412
Lower Tribunal No. 2021-CA-004420-O
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WILDE CYPRESS BRANCH, BOGGY BRANCH, CROSBY ISLAND MARSH, LAKE HART,
LAKE MARY JANE, AND ALL OTHER AFFECTED ORANGE COUNTY WATERS; and
CHARLES O’NEAL, as President of SPEAK UP WEKIVA, INC. ON BEHALF OF THE
WATERS OF ORANGE COUNTY,
Appellants,
v.
EMILE D. “SHAWN” HAMILTON, in his Official Capacity as Secretary of the
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, and
BEACHLINE SOUTH RESIDENTIAL, LLC,
Appellees.
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County.
Paetra T. Brownlee, Judge.
January 19, 2024
WOZNIAK, J.
Appellants, Wilde Cypress Branch, Boggy Branch, Crosby Island Marsh,
Lake Hart, Lake Mary Jane, and All Other Affected Orange County Waters (“Waters
of Orange County”); and Charles O’Neal, as President of Speak Up Wekiva, Inc. on
behalf of Waters of Orange County, appeal the final order of dismissal rendered on
2
the motion of Appellees, Beachline South Residential, LLC and Shawn Hamilton,
1
in his official capacity as Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.2
Appellants make several arguments for reversal of the trial court’s
order. We find no merit in the issues raised and affirm, but write to address
Appellants’ contention that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that
section 403.412(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2020), is constitutional and preempts
Orange County Charter section 704.1.
Because section 403.412(9)(a), Florida Statutes, precludes a “local
government regulation, ordinance, code, rule, comprehensive plan, charter, or any
other provision of law” from “recogniz[ing] or grant[ing] any legal rights to a plant,
an animal, a body of water, or any other part of the natural environment that is not a
person or political subdivision,” the Charter provision’s purported recognition of a
right held by water bodies within Orange County “to exist, Flow, to be protected
against Pollution and to maintain a healthy ecosystem,”3 was correctly held to be in
conflict with the statute and preempted thereby. See Fla. Power Corp. v. Seminole
Cnty., 579 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991) (“While the authority given to cities and
1 Emile D. “Shawn” Hamilton succeeded Noah Valenstein as Secretary of the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection during the course of this litigation.
Accordingly, we substitute Secretary Hamilton for Secretary Valenstein. See Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.260(d).
2 This case was transferred from the Fifth District Court of Appeal to this
Court on January 1, 2023. 3 Art. VII, § 704.1(A)(1), Orange County, Fla., Charter (2020).
3
counties in Florida is broad, both the constitution and statutes recognize that cities
and counties have no authority to act in areas that the legislature has preempted.”
(citations omitted)); Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494,
504 (Fla. 1999) (“If political subdivisions were able to continue actions to enforce
ordinances that conflict with general law, the political subdivisions would have the
power to frustrate the ability of the Legislature to set policies for the state.” (citation
omitted)). Without a cause of action under the Charter provision sued upon,
Appellants’ suit fails. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
STARGEL and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Roy D. Wasson, of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, and Steven M. Meyers,
of Meyers & Stanley, Maitland, for Appellants.
Judith M. Mercier and Jamie Billotte Moses, of Holland & Knight, LLP, Orlando,
Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., of Holland & Knight, LLP, Tallahassee, and Daniel
Mahfood, of Holland & Knight LLP, Jacksonville, for Appellee, Beachline South
Residential, LLC.
Justin G. Wolfe, General Counsel, and Jeffrey Brown, Complex Litigation Counsel,
of the Department of Environmental Protection, and Nicholas J. P. Meros, Deputy
General Counsel, of the Executive Office of The Governor, for Appellee, Emile D.
“Shawn” Hamilton, Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED